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Comparative Administrative Reform in Public Service Delivery: A Cross-Country Analysis of Indonesia and Singapore

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Abstract
This article examines the transferability of Singapore's digital administrative reform to decentralized Indonesian public service delivery, focusing on West Java's Electronic-Based Government System (SPBE) and the National Local Government Information System (SIPD-RI). A qualitative structured cross-country comparison, informed by policy-transfer analysis, reviews legal instruments, administrative documents, scholarly literature, and the United Nations' 2024 E-Government Development Index. Singapore's interoperable infrastructure, GovTech coordination, Public Service for the 21st Century, and professional workforce practices offer valuable mechanisms but not a replicable city-state institutional model. West Java's 2024 provincial SPBE score of 4.73 indicates high assessed maturity, whereas differences among its districts and cities reveal uneven institutional conditions. The proposed Contextual Policy Transferability Framework distinguishes directly reusable technical principles, practices requiring legal and organizational adaptation, and arrangements incompatible with regional autonomy. Privacy-compliant application programming interfaces, targeted talent mobility, and resident-centred monitoring emerge as reform priorities. Its social contribution is a measurable agenda for reducing learning, compliance, and psychological costs without compromising data protection or assisted access. These are proposed outcomes, not effects established by the documentary evidence.

Keywords: *Administrative Reform; Public Service Delivery; Comparative Governance; SPBE; Policy Transferability.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Administrative reform cannot be understood simply as replacing paperwork with applications. It redistributes authority, reshapes organizational incentives, and changes citizens' encounters with the state. Comparative public-management scholarship warns that apparently similar instruments operate differently because administrative legacies and political settings condition implementation (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017; Cheung, 2005). Indonesia and Singapore provide a revealing contrast: Indonesia combines national digital-government ambitions with constitutionally embedded decentralization, whereas Singapore's city-state structure facilitates concentrated coordination. A meaningful comparison should therefore investigate mechanisms and institutional fit, rather than infer that a higher international ranking supplies a directly exportable design. Reform success also depends on who bears transition costs: administrators may experience fewer manual reconciliations while residents face unfamiliar digital authentication, repeated eligibility checks, or weakened opportunities to challenge errors. This distributional issue makes service encounters, rather than administrative awards, the appropriate social-impact reference point.

Indonesia's Electronic-Based Government System, or SPBE, derives from Presidential Regulation No. 95/2018; the national SPBE architecture and acceleration of integrated digital services are further addressed by Presidential Regulations No. 132/2022 and No. 82/2023 (Republic of Indonesia, 2018, 2022a, 2023). The distinct Sistem Informasi Pemerintahan Daerah (SIPD), regulated by Minister of Home Affairs

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Regulation No. 70/2019, supports local development information, planning, finance, and related administration (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2019). SIPD-RI is thus not interchangeable with a citizen-facing SPBE portal. Its connection to external services depends on lawful exchange between operational, fiscal, and sectoral datasets.

West Java is analytically significant precisely because it is not a simple failure case. The 2024 SPBE assessment assigned its provincial government 4.73, categorized as *Memuaskan*. Yet the 27 districts and cities ranged from 2.94 in Majalengka Regency to 4.59 in Bandung City (Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform [PANRB], 2024). These agency-level scores establish variation in assessed digital maturity, not a measurement of individual civil-servant skills or citizens' service satisfaction. The provincial planning agency documented SIPD-RI use for 2025 planning and budgeting, including community proposals, and organized e-Walidata and sectoral-statistics coordination (West Java Development Planning Agency, 2024a, 2024b). Their coexistence creates a strong setting for examining whether administrative adoption translates into interoperable service journeys.

Singapore presents another organizational configuration. Its Public Service for the 21st Century (PS21) encouraged continuous improvement, while subsequent public-sector transformation emphasized coordinated citizen-centred service delivery (Public Service Division, 2018). GovTech develops shared government technology, and Smart Nation 2.0 articulates trust, growth, and community as organizing goals (Government Technology Agency of Singapore, 2026a; Smart Nation Singapore, 2025). Neo and Chen (2007) emphasize adaptive governing capabilities, although studies of Singaporean meritocracy also caution against equating institutional performance with politically neutral selection (Cheang & Choy, 2024).

In the United Nations' 2024 E-Government Development Index (EGDI), Singapore ranked third (0.9691), compared with Indonesia's 64th position (0.7991) (United Nations, 2024). World Bank governance indicators offer additional perceived-performance context but use different constructs and scales from EGDI and agency-level SPBE assessments (World Bank, 2026). None can establish that a specific platform caused greater service accessibility. Digital-transformation studies likewise stress organizational redesign beyond technology acquisition (Mergel, Edelmann, & Haug, 2019).

A research gap consequently remains between national success narratives and implementable choices for Indonesian local government. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) explain why insufficient attention to institutional context produces inappropriate policy transfers. This article contributes a Contextual Policy Transferability Framework (CPTF), an analytical synthesis—not a validated universal theory—screening proposed transfers by legal fit, organizational adaptability, operating capacity, and social accessibility. It asks which Singaporean administrative mechanisms can improve West Java's SPBE–SIPD-RI coordination without undermining decentralized authority or citizens' rights.

2. METHOD

The research applies a qualitative, structured-focused cross-country comparison informed by Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Singapore and Indonesia are contrasting national cases; West Java is a nested subnational Indonesian case. With two countries, formal set-theoretic QCA minimization would be methodologically unwarranted. Accordingly, QCA serves only as a condition-oriented comparative logic, not as a calibrated truth table or causal sufficiency test (Ragin, 1987).

Purposively selected documents include Indonesia's SPBE, SIPD, and personal-data-protection regulations; the 2024 PANRB evaluation; West Java planning publications; and Singaporean GovTech, Smart Nation, and Public Service Division materials. Scholarly works on comparative reform, policy transfer, digital platforms, meritocracy, and administrative burden complement these primary sources. The UN's 2024 EGDI and the World Bank's governance-indicator methodology support contextual triangulation; neither is treated as a directly comparable service-outcome variable.

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Content analysis coded five dimensions: authority and regulation; infrastructure and interoperability; privacy and accountability; workforce capacity; and citizen-level administrative burdens. Within each, documents were compared using evidence matrices and iterative data condensation, display, and conclusion verification following Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña (2014). Claims were separated into directly documented observations, reasoned institutional interpretations, and prospective recommendations. The CPTF then classifies transferability as can be transferred, needs adaptation, or un-transferable under specified conditions. No interviews, API penetration tests, transaction logs, or household surveys were available; consequently, proposed social-impact measures are operational indicators rather than observed treatment effects. Documents were selected for authoritative status, direct relevance to the compared institutions, and traceable publication details. Contradictory or incomplete evidence was not resolved through presumed implementation success. The analysis cannot determine whether variations are driven by infrastructure, budgets, leadership, geography, or staffing without follow-up fieldwork.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

3.1 Regulatory and Institutional Framework: Decentralized Fragmentation versus Singaporean Integration

Indonesia's regulatory trajectory supplies a substantial foundation for integration. SPBE establishes governance expectations; its national architecture specifies common reference domains; and the digital-service acceleration agenda seeks more coherent delivery (Republic of Indonesia, 2018, 2022a, 2023). SIPD-RI provides a complementary local-government planning and finance infrastructure, yet functional mandates remain distributed across central ministries, provincial offices, and autonomous district governments. These arrangements can generate competing reporting requirements and procurement incentives without demonstrating that every participating system is currently disconnected.

The West Java record shows both progress and coordination demands. PANRB's 2024 assessment of 4.73 for the province contrasts with 2.94–4.59 across its districts and cities. The range of 1.65 index points is a transparent descriptive indicator of uneven *organizational maturity*, not an estimate of workforce inequality (PANRB, 2024). Bappeda's SIPD-RI planning guidance and e-Walidata meetings substantiate administrative adoption and coordination efforts, but do not verify seamless exchange or citizen-level outcomes (West Java Development Planning Agency, 2024a, 2024b).

Singapore's administrative integration draws strength from its relatively concentrated territorial jurisdiction, shared technology stewardship, and repeated reform routines. PS21 and later transformation initiatives moved attention from agency outputs to citizens' whole service journeys (Public Service Division, 2018). This contrasts with Indonesia's need for intergovernmental negotiation, although neither system is entirely free of departmental silos. A policy transplant that centralizes lawful district decisions would mistake Singapore's enabling constitutional setting for a technical innovation (Cheung, 2005; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017).

A better institutional adjustment is federated coordination: national standards for essential identifiers and data formats; provincial technical assistance and stewardship; and local authorities retaining statutory service decisions. Intergovernmental agreements should define dataset custodians, correction responsibilities, access approvals, escalation procedures, funding, and procurement safeguards. The key reform object is not eliminating decentralization but preventing citizens from paying for duplicated governmental coordination. Governance agreements should contain an enforceable change-control process: when national data standards change, participating district systems need notice, migration support, version compatibility, and a named authority to adjudicate discrepancies. Without such arrangements, formal interoperability requirements can create new reporting burdens within the bureaucracy and delayed decisions for applicants.

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3.2 Digital Service Architecture, API Compliance, and Administrative Burden

Singapore's Government Tech Stack supports reusable authentication, hosting, notifications, and application-programming-interface infrastructure, including APEX for governed data connections (Government Technology Agency of Singapore, 2026a). Singpass provides digital identity, while Myinfo allows authenticated users to authorize retrieval of selected existing information for form pre-filling (Government Technology Agency of Singapore, 2026b; Singapore Government Developer Portal, 2025). The lesson is shared reusable components and a designed consent journey—not permission for indiscriminate interagency data access.

West Java's SIPD-RI primarily supports administrative processes rather than universal personal-data pre-filling. Bappeda's 2025-budget preparation guidance confirms institutional use but does not establish a deployed API linking individual citizen records to unrelated services (West Java Development Planning Agency, 2024b). A sensible interoperability pilot would begin with program identifiers, standardized administrative codes, non-sensitive service metadata, and validated aggregate indicators. Transfers of personal records would demand a separate necessity, authority, and security assessment. An Indonesian fiscal-integration study reports persistent SIPD-RI integration challenges across local governments, but its cross-regional findings must not be represented as West Java-specific measurements (Sulistyowati, 2025). Indonesia's Personal Data Protection Law, Law No. 27/2022, changes the appropriate design standard. API exchange involving identifiable individuals requires a lawful basis, purpose limitation, proportionality, security controls, and allocated controller–processor responsibilities (Republic of Indonesia, 2022b). Consent is **one** possible legal basis, not invariably the proper basis for mandatory governmental functions. Compared with Myinfo's consent-based pre-filling, Indonesian services need a context-sensitive distinction between genuinely optional user-authorized retrieval and legally required interagency processing. Proposed controls include granular authorization, encryption, audit logs, access expiry, documented data-sharing agreements, data-subject correction channels, and privacy review before deployment. Neither SPBE maturity scores nor this desk study demonstrate existing full compliance. Data controllers should also publish understandable notices identifying which information is exchanged, why it is needed, how long it is retained, and where a resident can challenge inaccuracies. Privacy-preserving design must be evaluated against actual access logs, not merely against signed organizational agreements.

Administrative burden supplies the citizen-facing test. *Learning costs* concern finding rules and eligibility; *compliance costs* encompass travel, documentation, fees, and repeated submissions; *psychological costs* include stress, uncertainty, and perceived disrespect (Herd & Moynihan, 2018; Herd, Hoynes, Michener, & Moynihan, 2023). Digital platforms can reduce one burden while increasing another, particularly for people without connectivity or accessibility support. A once-only principle should therefore include assisted or offline alternatives and corrections for erroneous source records. Platform governance achieves public value only when backend coordination reduces real work imposed on residents (Janssen & Estevez, 2013).

3.3 Human Capital, Meritocracy, and Bureaucratic Mindset

Singapore's PS21 improvement culture and GovTech engineering capacity demonstrate how technical infrastructure interacts with professional learning. Public Service Division publications recognize merit and performance while emphasizing responsive leadership (Public Service Division, 2014, 2018). Dynamic governance requires officials to think ahead, reconsider inherited routines, and coordinate across institutional boundaries (Neo & Chen, 2007). Yet the claim of *pure meritocracy* overstates what evidence supports: Singaporean scholarship documents tensions surrounding narrowly specified merit, political power, and stratification (Cheang & Choy, 2024).

In West Java, institutional score disparities make a case for differentiated support, but not for asserting that a given district's staff are individually less competent. A province scoring 4.73 operates alongside districts and cities with lower assessments, while planning, finance, technology, statistics, and frontline workers face distinct competency demands (PANRB, 2024). Technical bottlenecks may stem from staffing, vendor dependence, budgets, procedures, or legacy systems. These competing explanations require personnel audits, skills tests, vacancy records, and service-process observation rather than assumptions about cultural resistance.

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A feasible capacity-building and digital-talent mobility program would use provincial mentoring hubs, jointly funded short rotations, shared specialist pools, and competency certification for API architecture, data stewardship, cybersecurity, and accessible service design. Provincial teams could temporarily support district integration projects while district officials retain decision authority and receive documented skills transfer. Recruitment and progression should use published competency criteria, independent review, and incentives for solving cross-agency service problems. Rotations must protect continuity and avoid simply relocating scarce personnel. A transparent provincial roster could match specialists to time-limited district projects, require paired working with local staff, and record post-assignment competencies. Procurement contracts should require documentation and handover, so progress remains institutionally owned rather than dependent on one vendor or secondee. Such measures translate Singapore's professional-improvement logic without importing its centralized personnel arrangements.

3.4 Policy Transferability Matrix and Social Impact Optimization

The CPTF applies four tests to each mechanism: legal fit with Indonesian decentralization and privacy duties; institutional adaptability of coordination arrangements; operational capability to sustain systems and personnel; and social accessibility across unequal user groups. Technical designs may transfer relatively directly, while personnel and oversight institutions demand adaptation. The city-state distribution of public authority is un-transferable as a constitutional design for Indonesian districts. These categories are interpretive classifications grounded in policy-transfer scholarship, not scores derived from a statistical QCA model (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000).

Table 1. Comparative Analysis and Policy Transferability Matrix: Singapore and Indonesia (West Java Context)

Dimension	Singapore Benchmark	Indonesia/West Java Practice	Transferability Level	Strategic Policy Adaptation
Institutional authority	Whole-of-government coordination	Decentralized SPBE and function-specific SIPD-RI	Needs adaptation	Federated standards, local legal discretion, binding exchange agreements
Shared service architecture	GovTech stack, Singpass, APEX	Provincial platforms and varied district systems	Can be transferred	Reusable components, versioned APIs, service-level tests
Data protection	Authenticated, consent-based Myinfo journeys	Personal Data Protection Law and varied lawful purposes	Needs adaptation	Purpose-specific legal bases, minimal access, logs, correction channels
Workforce capability	PS21, professional learning, merit assessment	Uneven institutional SPBE scores; skills unmeasured	Needs adaptation	Provincial mentoring, talent mobility, independent competency review
Territorial governance	Integrated city-state authority	Autonomous district/city powers	Un-transferable	Preserve regional mandates and elected local decision-making
Citizen impact	Service-journey simplification and pre-filling	Burdens and outcomes not directly measured	Needs adaptation	Baseline and follow-up measures across all three burden types

Source: Author synthesis from Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), PANRB (2024), Republic of Indonesia (2022b), West Java Development Planning Agency (2024a, 2024b), and Government Technology Agency of Singapore (2026a).

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The matrix implies a phased administrative program rather than wholesale replication. A first stage should select two or three legally bounded service journeys and establish baseline maps of datasets, forms, approvals, and complaints. The next stage would test a common API catalogue with logging, role-based access, and a documented correction route. Only verified transactions should be scaled, with procurement tied to interoperability standards and security testing. Singapore's reuse-before-build rationale is adaptable, but local fiscal powers and existing sector-specific mandates must remain visible (Government Technology Agency of Singapore, 2026a).

Social impact can be quantified prospectively without inventing present results. For *learning costs*, record median minutes needed to locate accurate requirements, the number of guidance contacts per 100 applications, and the proportion understanding eligibility on first inquiry. For *compliance costs*, measure documents resubmitted per case, physical visits, out-of-pocket expenditure, completion time, and failed API exchanges per 100 transactions. For *psychological costs*, use a pre/post five-point survey of uncertainty, perceived fairness, stress, and confidence in correction or appeal. Each metric should report a baseline, follow-up, service category, and distribution by accessibility needs and geography; reductions are hypotheses to be tested, not documented findings (Herd et al., 2023).

Social protection requires special care: a faster online process that excludes digitally inexperienced households is not necessarily an overall improvement. Assisted channels, disability-accessible interfaces, comprehensible notices, human appeals, and periodic independent privacy reviews are therefore part of efficiency rather than exceptions to it. EGDI rankings and the World Bank's perception-based governance measures contextualize administrative environments, but cannot causally validate an API pilot (United Nations, 2024; World Bank, 2026). The strongest transferable achievement would be a documented reduction in residents' administrative effort combined with lawful, reviewable government decisions.

4. CONCLUSION

Comparing Indonesia and Singapore shows that the most useful object of policy transfer is an administrative mechanism, not a foreign governmental structure. Singapore combines reusable digital infrastructure, coordinated institutional stewardship, and routines of professional improvement within a compact jurisdiction. Indonesia must pursue similarly coherent citizen-facing outcomes through a decentralized allocation of powers. West Java's 2024 provincial SPBE score of 4.73 demonstrates strong assessed maturity, while variation among district and city assessments and documented SIPD-RI coordination activities underline the need to distinguish institutional readiness from end-to-end interoperability and social benefit. Neither an international index nor a local maturity rating directly measures the time, effort, and anxiety experienced by service users.

The recommended reform sequence begins with lawful service-journey selection, agreement on common data meanings, limited API pilots, explicit privacy responsibilities, and joint testing across provincial and district agencies. Provincial digital specialists should support less-resourced local teams through short rotations and mentoring, with merit-based assessment and knowledge transfer built into the program. Shared components should reduce duplicate procurement without taking statutory decisions away from autonomous authorities. Leadership review should prioritize transaction reliability, correction accessibility, and citizens' ability to complete services using digital or assisted channels rather than the number of applications launched.

Finally, social accountability requires publishing baseline and follow-up measures for learning, compliance, and psychological costs, including whether improvements reach underserved residents. Privacy safeguards, clear legal processing grounds, auditability, and accessible grievance procedures should be treated as constitutive of good service delivery. The proposed framework offers a disciplined agenda for provincial reform but remains untested against direct transaction observations. Subsequent research should combine API audits, district-level process tracing, civil-servant capability assessments, and interviews with service users before making causal claims. Under these conditions, learning from Singapore becomes institutionally realistic and socially accountable rather than an exercise in copying an exceptional city-state.

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